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in the Context of Financialization   
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of UK institutional holdings on the financialization process 
and the performance of listed companies with and without institutional investors. Using panel 
data analysis, we find that institutional holdings have a positive impact on the financialization 
process. Further, companies that attract institutional investors outperform their peers matched by 
industry and size. These findings suggest that institutional investors add value to the capital 
market and play an instrumental role in shaping the financialization process. Using Granger 
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1. Introduction 
Financialization describes a specific process, occurring over a period of time during which 
capitalism evolves into a system dominated by finance as a key determinant of both economic 
and social activities, as well as the growth of financial profitability. Epstein (2005) defines 
financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors 
and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (p.3). The 
institutional setting of financialization has largely been framed in an environment dominated by 
the global deregulation of both financial and labor markets. 
 
Given the extent to which financialization affects the growth of financial profits over time, it is 
inevitable that institutional investors influence corporate management and firm performance. For 
instance, the accumulation of pension and retirement savings over the last 60 years has had a 
profound impact on the efficient utilization of these assets (Clowes, 2000). Hence, institutional 
investors could not only influence their portfolio companies, but also the capital market.  
Previous studies (see, for example, Black, 1998) have attempted to empirically gauge the impact 
of institutional investors on the performance of listed companies - including stock price 
movements, CEO turnover, and institutional monitoring - based on the size of ownership. To the 
best of our knowledge, however, the influence of institutional holdings on financialization has 
remained unexplored. It would be interesting to understand the role played, if any, by 
institutional investors in shaping the financialization process. We use proxies for financialization 
and investigate the impact of institutional holdings on the financialization process. Since the 
relationship could be unidirectional or bidirectional, we use Granger causality tests το gain 
further insights into the causal dimension.   
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Our results show that institutional holdings have a positive and significant effect on the 
financialization process. Further tests on causality show that there is a unidirectional causality 
that runs from institutional holdings to financialization. Stated differently, institutional holdings 
Granger cause the financialization process and the relationship is one way. In addition, we find 
that firms that attract only individual institutional investors do not outperform their peers 
matched by size and industry. However, firms that attract multiple institutional investors 
outperform their peers significantly, and the evidence is consistent when using institutional 
investors' portfolio weights instead of holdings. We find that performance differences between 
companies with and without institutional investors are explained by macroeconomic factors such 
as (i) the marginal efficiency of capital, (ii) real long-term interest rates, (iii) real effective 
exchange rates, (iv) GDP per capita, and (v) total factor productivity. Interestingly, the 
outperformance of companies that attract institutional investors, specifically corporations and 
insurance firms, remains significant even after controlling for macroeconomic factors. This 
suggests these investors add more value to the capital markets than other institutional investors 
and play a significant role in the financialization of the capital markets. Overall, our results show 
institutional investors play a significant role in shaping financialization and companies that 
attract institutional investors outperform their peers, based on industry-adjusted and unadjusted 
performance measures. 
This paper contributes to the extant literature on the impact of institutional investors by exploring 
the role of institutional holdings in the process of financialization and by showing that the 
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companies that attract these investors outperform their counterparts matched by size and industry 
between 1997 and 20101.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the key theoretical arguments 
pertaining to the financialization literature. Section 3 elaborates on the data as well as the 
methodological aspects of the empirical analysis and Section 4 discusses the results. Finally, 
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review  
The financialization process consists of two interdependent processes. According to 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011), the first process relates to the importance of financial 
services, whilst the second is linked to the increased involvement of nonfinancial firms in 
financial activity.   
On the empirical front, the number of studies exploring the impact of financial globalization on 
economic growth has increased significantly, producing conflicting evidence. Kose et al. (2009) 
argue that “there is still little robust evidence of the growth benefits of broad capital account 
liberalization, but several recent papers in the finance literature report that equity market 
liberalizations do significantly boost growth” (p.143).  
Most importantly, the new role of the financial sector as owners of corporations has dramatically 
affected the real economy in terms of production, employment, and investment decisions insofar 
as the objective is the maximization of shareholder value. In the same vein, Aglietta (2000) 
 
1
 The impact of institutional investors on firm performance is well established. See Fich et al. (2015), Nagel et al. 
(2015), and Parrino et al. (2003). 
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argues that shareholder value is the new norm in the transformation of capitalism whilst van der 
Zwan (2014) contends that this norm has “provided the justification for the dissemination of new 
policies and practices favouring shareholders over other constituents of the firm” (p.102).   
Currently, financialization is viewed as one of the key elements of a more general paradigm shift 
in social and economic relations (see, for instance, Krippner, 2011). Private institutions such as 
institutional investors – including the market for financial services – have grown significantly 
over the past four decades, dominating the management of global financial assets (Davis and 
Steil, 2001). According to the OECD (2011), “institutional investors are financial institutions 
that accept funds from third parties for investment in their own name but on such parties’ behalf” 
(p.9). They include insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds, while other forms 
such as sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, and private equity represent a smaller share of the 
industry. The fact that large investments are made by the fund management industry for the 
benefits of their clients makes institutional investors a noteworthy force in the capital markets. 
Insofar as they pursue the optimization of returns for specific levels of risk, as well as for 
prudential regulation, institutional investors’ portfolios comprise diversified investments across 
numerous companies.  
Remuneration for private equity and hedge funds is linked to the performance of portfolio 
companies. For most institutional investors, however, remuneration is directly tied to the volume 
of assets under management, whilst fund performance is assessed based on short-term mandates. 
However, as indicated by Fich et al. (2015), the empirical evidence on the role of institutions in 
improving shareholder wealth is mixed and inconclusive. Furthermore, Clark and Knight (2008) 
argue that the growth of savings for retirement, in institutions distanced from the immediate 
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interests of sponsoring companies, significantly changes the balance of power in the financial 
markets in favour of third-party investors.  
The nature and significance of the new structure of the Anglo-American financial markets is 
detailed in Clark (2000) and Davis and Steil (2001). The accumulation of pension and retirement 
savings over the last 60 years has had a profound impact on the efficient utilization of these 
assets, driving a wedge between traded companies and institutional investors, and their market 
intermediaries (Clowes, 2000). As a result, a new structure of global financial markets has 
emerged (MacKenzie, 2006). 
According to Campbell and Viceira (2002), a majority of pension funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, and endowments are aligned with the principles of modern portfolio theory. This 
suggests (i) there is a correlation between risk and return on the basis of which particular 
investments can be assessed in accordance with their expected risk-adjusted rates of return; (ii) 
the focal point of investment strategy is managing portfolio risk so that the associated risk of a 
particular investment and the returns should be assessed against the investors’ overall objectives; 
and (iii) markets are so efficient that active investment is not a viable long-term investment 
strategy. In other words, the modern portfolio theory provides the basis upon which particular 
stocks are treated as components in a comprehensive strategy of investment management.  
On the empirical front, existing evidence suggests that higher institutional ownership is linked to 
higher R&D and capital expenditure (Baysinger et al., 1991; Wahal and McConnell, 2000), as 
well as increased likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 
2005). Moreover, institutional ownership is associated with more extensive social, ethical, and 
environmental disclosure, as well as reduced earnings for management (Solomon and Solomon, 
2006; Hsu and Koh, 2005). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) found that the magnitude of institutional 
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investment is bound to influence management and ensure they operate in the interests of 
shareholders, whilst Johnson et al. (2010) argue that it reduces the costs of acquiring 
information.  
Undoubtedly, institutional investors have transpired to form a rather complex system of financial 
institutions and fund management companies operating under their own corporate governance. 
According to Clark et al. (2005), “with the increasing global significance of institutional 
investors and their portfolio managers, common standards set within well-defined parameters are 
clearly on the agenda; convergence is the name of the game rather than a tapestry of multi-
coloured threads stitched together for the sake of expediency” (p.1).  
Within the sphere of global financial flows, significant volumes of currencies are traded on a 
daily basis, whilst portfolio managers seek to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. Clark 
and Wójcik (2003) argue that, in the world of market flows and inter-market arbitrage, 
information which comes at a premium has significant implications for market efficiency, as well 
as for the investment performance of portfolio managers. 
In drawing parallels with Chandler’s (1990) managerial capitalism, Clark et al. (2005) refer to 
the object of institutional investment managers as insider capitalism. In this context, they argue 
that “the object of institutional investment managers … is to wring out from those institutions the 
value held by managers and the untraded benefits that flow through the relationships between 
insiders as opposed to the property rights of outsiders” (p.2). Currently, institutional investment 
has provided the basis upon which corporate restructuring is taking place (Clark and Wójcik, 
2005). 
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Notably, one way investment managers have sought to extract value from global financial 
markets around the world has been by focusing on the empirical relationships that might be 
found between corporate governance and market value. Inevitably, the conventional metrics 
implied by finance theory or those proposed by the International Accounting Standards Board 
constitute a necessary but not a sufficient condition for investment practice. 
The displacement, in the Anglo-American world, of managerial capitalism by financial 
capitalism ushered in an era of the formation of novel national and global institutions with access 
to a variety of financial resources far greater than those available to self-financing manufacturing 
corporations. In this context, Jensen (1993) argues that these new financial institutions have been 
particularly hostile in the battle for corporate control of the market, imposing a new set of rules, 
regulations, and practices.  
To date, stock markets have largely been dominated by institutional investors, turning this novel 
form of capitalism into a system in which financial institutions are privileged in terms of 
production and financial investment opportunities. In extracting stock value from incumbent 
managers, institutional investors have formulated strategies that focus on managers’ relationships 
with other groups inside and outside of the corporation. In this sense, corporations have become 
exclusive clubs for highly paid but underperforming corporate elites. As such, an investment 
strategy for corporate domination has become synonymous with market speculation that extends 
beyond geographical boundaries and institutional systems.  
Brownlee (2005) argues that the emerging corporate elite is different from a capitalist class, 
whilst Scott (2008, p.37) defines the economic elite as an “inter-organizational group of people 
who hold positions of dominance in business organizations and who may, under certain 
circumstances, have certain additional powers available to them”. 
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Financial elites or, according to Pareto’s (2008) term, ‘speculators’, were propelled to 
prominence due, in the main, to the successful implementation of a short-term profitability 
model that put paid to the managerial elites associated with the post-war Keynesian social 
framework. The new era that followed the demise of Keynesianism was characterized by 
deregulation of financial and labour markets that led to the rise of a new form of ‘mutated 
capitalism’ in which employers could no longer keep their side of the bargain (Thompson, 2003). 
Finance-oriented managers are now in charge of powerful corporations with a remit to increase 
stock prices (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005). The notion of the shareholder value of a firm has given 
way to practices that link managerial performance to stock-option perks reflecting short-termism 
rather than long-term market share, sales, or production-based profit (see Krier, 2005). In the 
non-finance sectors, corporate leaders have switched from investment strategies that target long-
term and productive gains to the short-term goal of increased profitability (Davis, 2009; 
Stockhammer, 2004; Useem, 1993). As a result, investment in new productive capital is fading 
away, whereas financial investment is flourishing.   
In view of the above exposition, it is evident that the impact of institutional investors on 
corporate management, board behaviour, and hence investment strategies has significant 
implications for the performance of the firm which, in turn, acts as a catalyst for the state of the 
entire economic environment per se. However, the question of whether institutional investors 
(i.e. their holdings) influence the financialization process remains unexplored. This paper aims to 





3.  Empirical Investigation  
3.1 Data 
Our sample consists of 4,000 investments made by UK institutional investors in 651 firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 1997 and 2010.2 The list of portfolio companies 
and holdings of these institutional investors, including their classifications, is collected from 
Thomson One Banker. For each portfolio company, we collect data from DataStream’s 
accounting information to calculate the performance measure (return on assets, ROA) and 
industry classifications. We track the performance of these unique portfolio companies for up to 
10 years and a minimum of 5 years (for the 2010 sample, we track the performance to the end of 
2015).3 Next, we match these portfolio companies to unbacked portfolio companies listed in a 
market, by industry and size, over the same sample period. We find 1,074 matched unbacked 
portfolio companies that satisfy our industry and size matching criteria and track their 
performances for up to 10 years as well. The accounting data and information on industry 
classification for these unbacked companies are also obtained from DataStream. Given that 
macroeconomic factors are beyond the control of an organization, we incorporate a string of 
variables assumed to predict the heterogeneous effects of macroeconomic activity on future 
corporate performance (Broadstock et al., 2011). For this purpose, we collect a set of 
macroeconomic variables and proxies for financialization from the macroeconomics database 
provided by the European Commission and the IMF from 1997 to 2015.  
The focus of this paper is on the UK market because of the unique feature of its institutional 
investors relative to those in the US market. Typically, UK institutional investors have more 
 
2
 We include in our study companies for which total institutional holdings are more than 5%.  
3 Our sample ends in 2010, enabling us to track the performance of firms in our sample for at least five years. Our 
data show that all backed companies had institutional investors to the end of the sample period. 
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controlling power in their portfolio companies than US institutional investors. For instance, 
shareholders in the UK can initiate a change to the company memorandum and the articles of 
association. In most cases, such changes can be made by a ‘special resolution’, which requires a 
supermajority approval of 75% of the votes cast at the shareholders’ meeting. However, in the 
US only the board can initiate any change to the corporate charter and the state of incorporation. 
Shareholders only have the power of veto. Another difference is that investors who hold more 
than 5% of the voting rights, or at least 100 shareholders, can compel the company to put a 
resolution to the meeting and to circulate a statement of less than 1000 words before the meeting 
based on the UK Companies Act (1985). However, in the US shareholders can only request that 
the board adds a proposal, and the board is not bound by the proposal even if it receives a voting 
majority. Therefore, the UK market provides a good setting, compared to other markets, for 
investigating the role played by institutional investors in financialization.  
3.2 Methodology 
We use the standard OLS panel model to establish the impact of institutional investors on 
financialization as well as to examine the performance of firms backed and unbacked by 
institutional investors.4 We estimate the following two models: 
 
FINit = α0 + βΙ Institutionit + βC Controlit + Industry + Year + εit                                                   (1) 
              ROAit = α0 + βΙ Institutionit + βC Controlit + βM Macrofactorit +Industry + Year + εit     (2)                                      
 
 
4 Since ROA can take both positive and negative values, panel OLS regression is an appropriate estimation 
technique for our setting. 
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where FIN is the Financial Development Index (for robustness two additional indices have also 
been used, the Financial Institution Index and the Financial Market Depth Index). In this context, 
“financial development is defined as a measure of a combination of depth (size and liquidity of 
markets), access (ability of individuals and companies to access financial services), and 
efficiency (ability of institutions to provide financial services at low cost and with sustainable 
revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets)” (see Svirydzenka, 2016, p.6)5. The 
Financial Institutions Depth Index is a proxy that enhances the standard banking sector depth 
measure used in the literature (bank credit to the private sector). Financial institutions efficiency 
takes into account three aspects of bank efficiency: (i) efficiency in intermediating savings to 
investment, (ii) operational efficiency measures, and (iii) profitability measures. The financial 
market index reflects stock market and debt market development. ROA is the return on assets. 
Institution is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the firm is backed by corporations, 
pension funds, insurance companies, or bank and trusts, and 0 otherwise. Control includes firm 
characteristics such as leverage, total assets, and liquidity6.  
Macroeconomic factors include the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) which is intended to 
capture expected profitability; the real long-term interest rate (RIR) and real effective exchange 
rate (REER), reflecting monetary and financial conditions; GDP per capita, a measure of the 
country’s relative performance, total factor productivity (TFP), a measure of efficiency, house 
 
5
 For more on studies using the respective measures of financialization, see (Sung-Jun, 2016 and Mullings, 2018).  
6
 Note that in this paper we are concerned with the analysis of financialization through financial institutions' 
ownership of common stock. We are grateful to a referee for noting that it is possible for institutional investors' 
ownership of common stock to increase even while the financial sector's overall importance in financing assets 
shrinks, or while the financial institutions' contribution to GDP shrinks (see DeAngelo et al., 2008; Grinstein and 
Michaely, 2005).  
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prices – intended to capture the impact of financialization on housing finance, and finally, 
household debt.   
There is ample evidence to suggest that the macroeconomic environment has a strong impact on 
firms’ financial position (see, for instance, Brown and Ball, 1967; McNamara and Duncan, 1995; 
Boyd et al., 2005; Stock and Watson, 2008; Broadstock et al., 2011; Barakat et al., 2016). Our 
selection of macroeconomic factors is in line with the existing literature. More specifically, Issah 
and Antwi (2017) suggest that the relative performance of a country and its monetary or financial 
condition are closely associated with firms’ performance based on profitability (see Burja and 
Burja, 2009). According to Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), TFP is a significant factor 
influencing shareholder value creation and hence business performance. Furthermore, Fernandez 
and Aalbers (2016) argue that the rise of housing finance might be an integral part of macro-
economic policy which drives housing finance. Finally, financialization, through raising 
consumption patterns, has caused higher household debt structures with distributional 
implications to be formed (Palley, 1994).  
 We control for industry and year in all our estimations. We test that the variables are not highly 
correlated to ensure there is no bias from multicollinearity. We use robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. The impact of each macro variable is examined separately, as there 
are high correlations between these variables. Below, we explain the motivation for our choice of 
control variables and the expected signs of their coefficients. 
3.3 Other control variables  
We use Size as measured by the logarithm of firms' assets. Collins et al. (1987) show that firm 
size reflects the quality of the firm's information environment. High-quality firms might be 
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reluctant to invest in a project that is value-destroying. Hence, they are likely to invest in safe 
projects leading to lower returns. Based on this, we would expect a negative relationship between 
firm size and performance. Conversely, it is possible that shareholders of high-quality firms will 
expect high returns and hence managers of such firms are likely to take on riskier projects with 
high expected returns to satisfy the shareholders’ expectations. In this case, we would expect a 
positive relationship between firm size and performance. Firms with high Leverage may struggle 
to raise funding to finance their growth potential. Hence, they are likely to forgo good 
investments with higher expected returns due to capital constraints. Therefore, we expect a 
negative relationship between Leverage and performance. Firms with higher Liquidity (as 
measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities) have better bargaining power when 
discussing their credit terms with short-term suppliers. Typically, suppliers are eager to extend 
credit terms for firms with higher liquidity ratios. Hence, firms are likely to invest their cash in 
short-term projects to boost their performance. We expect a positive relationship between 
Liquidity and performance. We also use Institutional holdings and expect a positive relationship 
between them and performance. This is because institutional investors are actively engaged in 
their portfolio firms, in terms of investment and providing the capital required to finance growth 
opportunities. Therefore, firms with institutional investors are expected to outperform those 
without them. Next, we discuss the univariate results, followed by the multivariate results. 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
Our main focus of attention in this paper is the holdings (i.e. ownership) of institutional 
investors, since higher holdings indicate a greater impact of institutional investors on financial 
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markets. In Table 1, columns 1- 4 show the average holding for the population between 1997 and 
2010. Corporations maintained their holdings from 1997 to 2007, but their holdings then 
decreased by approximately 12.7% between 2007 and 2010. Pension funds’ holdings in their 
portfolio companies had been in the range of 40% to 53%, but post-2002 these holdings fell to 
less than 20% and then remained at this level to the end of 2010. Similarly, insurance companies 
decreased their holdings from over 30% to less than 20% post-2000. Interestingly, banks and 
trusts have maintained their 7-13% range of holdings between 1998 and 2010. The fact that 
institutional investors have adjusted their holdings downward, suggests a decline in the size of 
their investments, despite an increase in the number of their investments.  
Columns 5-8 of Table 1 show the holding of our random sample of 4,000 investments in 651 
portfolio companies.  It is clear from the table that our random sample provides a good 
representation of the population in terms of institutional  holdings between 1997 and 2010. Our 
analysis, therefore, is unlikely to be biased towards specific institutional investors. Furthermore, 
as Table 1 suggests, holdings of corporations are higher than those of other investors, while 
holdings of banks and trusts are lower on average. This is consistent for the population and 
random sample. 
The values in brackets of Table 1 show the distribution of investments made by UK institutional 
investors between 1997 and 2010. Columns 1 through 4 show for the populations, while columns 
5 to 8 show for the random sample. During the sample period, insurance companies have made 
the lowest amount of investments. Clearly, banks and trusts, pension funds, and corporations are 
the key players and contribute significantly to the size and scope of the UK stock market. It is 
evident from the table that, in the period prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007/08, 
these institutional investors had been making fewer investments, but after the crisis, the number 
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of investments increased almost fourfold, even during the onset of the GFC. Interestingly, the 
number of investments before and after the GFC remain qualitatively unchanged. There is no 
evidence to suggest a decline in the number of investments during and after the financial crisis. 
This signifies the role played by institutional investors in the capital market. Indeed, investments 
made by these investors have been steadily since 2006. 
Overall,  the table shows that the difference in means between the population and the random 
sample is not significant at any conventional level. This suggests that our results based on the 
random sample can be generalized to the entire population of institutional investors.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the portfolio companies. Panel A 
shows the results for the full sample while Panel B shows the results for the subsamples that are 
backed and respectively not backed by institutional investors. The mean leverage for the full 
sample is 10.5% with a median of 4.5%. The maximum for the companies in our sample is 
35.5%, while the minimum is zero. This is consistent with the fact that UK companies are less 
leveraged than their US counterparts. ROA, which measures the performance, is positive on 
average, with a mean of 10.9% and a median of 3.2%. The maximum ROA is 66% and the 
minimum -69.2%. The average size of the firms in our sample, as measured by total assets, is 
£5.6 billion while the median is £4.8 billion. The largest company in our sample has total assets 
of £40.42 billion, while the smallest has total assets of £454 million. The liquidity, as measured 
by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, is 1.87 on average, with a median of 1.37. This 
suggests that firms in our sample have the ability, on average, to meet their short-term financial 
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obligations. In Panel B, we examine the differences in means between firms backed by 
institutional investors and those not backed. There are no differences in either leverage or 
liquidity between the two subsamples. However, the backed companies perform better on 
average and are larger in size than the unbacked ones. The differences in performance and size 
between the backed and unbacked companies are significant at the 5% level. Overall, the results 
show that the characteristics of the backed and unbacked companies are similar in terms of 
leverage and liquidity, but the backed companies perform significantly better than the unbacked 
ones. Next, we examine whether the differences in performance can be explained by firm 
characteristics or macroeconomic factors.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4.2 Exploring the causal effects   
Insofar as institutional investors play a significant role in the capital market, we expect their 
holdings to influence financialization activities. A significant impact of institutional holdings on 
the financialization index would suggest that institutional investors influenced financialization in 
the capital market. However, it is critical to assess the causality in the relationships between the 
two. Hence, we investigate how changes in the institutional holdings influence changes in 
financialization. We additionally use the Granger causality test and find that institutional 
holdings Granger cause financialization, whereas financialization does not Granger cause 
institutional holdings (see Appendix B for these results). This suggests that the relationship 
between institutional holdings and financialization is unidirectional. We use three proxies for 
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financialization: (i) the Financial Development Index, (ii) the Financial Institution Index, and 
(iii) the Financial Market Depth Index7.  
The results for these proxies are reported in Models 1-3 of Table 3. Based on these results, 
changes in the institutional holdings appear to have a positive and highly significant impact on 
changes in financialization. Therefore, institutional investors significantly influence the process 
of financialization in the market. Thus, we proceed to the next step in which we further 
investigate the channels through which institutional holdings influence the financialization 
process. To do so, we compare the performance of listed firms backed by institutional investors 
to that of firms not backed by institutional investors.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
4.3 Multivariate analysis  
It is evident from Table 3 that institutional holdings have a positive impact on financialization. 
However, there are different channels through which institutional investors could influence 
financialization, including the performance of their portfolio companies. If their portfolio 
companies are outperforming in the market, this performance will be contributing to the capital 
market and financialization alike. We examine the contribution of institutional investors to the 
financialization process by investigating the performance of the companies they back. Table 4 
shows the determinants of the performance as measured by ROA for firms backed by 
institutional investors versus unbacked companies. Model 1 shows the performance differences 
between companies backed by corporations and unbacked companies; Model 2 shows the 
differences for pension-fund-backed companies; Model 3 shows the results for insurance-firm-
 
7
 For further details on the construction of the indices used, see Svirydzenka (2016) 
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backed companies; Model 4 shows the results for banks and trusts. It is evident in Models 1, 2, 
and 4 that the size of the firm and leverage have negative impacts on performance, while 
liquidity, measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, has a positive impact on 
performance. The variables of interests in Models 1, 2, and 4 are the dummy variables for 
corporations, pension funds, and banks and trusts. It is clear from these models that firms backed 
by these types of institutional investors do not outperform unbacked companies. However, firms 
backed by insurance companies do outperform unbacked ones and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
We next extend our analysis by examining the impact of a string of macroeconomic factors on 
the performance of backed and unbacked companies. As mentioned previously, we use five 
macroeconomic variables deemed to significantly affect firms’ performance: (i) the marginal 
efficiency of capital (MEC), (ii) the real long-term interest rate (RIR), (iii) the real effective 
exchange rate (REER), (iv) GDP per capita, and (v) total factor productivity (TFP). Due to the 
high correlations between them, we examine their impact on performance individually. The 
results are shown in Table 5. Models 1-5 show respectively the impact of the MEC, RIR, REER, 
GDP per capita, and TFP. Models 1 and 3 suggest that increases in the MEC and the REER have 
a positive impact on performance, while increases in the RIR have a negative impact. GDP per 
capita and TFP are found to exert no impact on performance. The finding that companies backed 
by corporations and insurance companies outperform unbacked companies is robust when 
controlling for macroeconomic factors. Together, the results show that macroeconomic factors 
explain away the better performance of companies backed by pension funds or banks and trusts. 
 20 
However, these factors do not explain away the better performance of companies backed by 
corporations or insurance companies. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
4.4 Multivariate analysis – Further perspectives 
In Table 5 we show the contemporaneous effect of the relationship between institutional 
holdings and performance. Provided institutional holdings influence the performance of the 
portfolio companies, it is more sensible to examine whether changes in holdings influence 
changes in performance. In other words, we are looking at whether an increase in the previous 
institutional holdings improves future firm performance. Panel A of Table 6 shows the results for 
the full sample. It can be seen that changes in the institutional holdings enhance the performance 
of the companies, controlling for macroeconomic variables. It is evident from the table that firms 
that attract backing from corporations and insurance companies tend, on average, to do better. 
We conclude from the table that increases in institutional holdings enhance performance. 
However, it is possible that institutional investors tend to invest more in firms that already have 
better performance. Therefore, the evidence of an increase in the institutional holdings enhancing 
the performance is inconclusive. To distinguish between selection and value added by 
institutional investors to their backed companies, we split the sample into high- and low-ROA 
portfolio companies. Panel B of Table 6 shows the results for the subsample of firms whose 
ROA is below the median value. Model 1-6 are similar to Panel A, but based on a subsample of 
firms where ROA is below median values. It is evident from Models 1-6 that institutional 
holdings have a positive impact on ROA. This indicates that institutional investors add value to 
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their portfolio companies regardless of their holdings. Overall, the results show that the presence 
of institutional investors enhances firm performance as measured by ROA.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
To avoid the possible bias associated with the raw ROA, we also use the industry adjusted ROA. 
For each firm in our sample in each year, we subtract the median industry returns, using the 
Fama and French 12-industry classification. Panel A of Table 7 shows the impact of institutional 
holdings on these industry-adjusted ROAs. Models 1-5 show that an increase in the holdings 
improves the performance adjusted by the industry, consistent with the results reported in Table 
6. Following Fich et al. (2015), we also use portfolio weights, as an additional measure of 
institutional holdings. They argue that institutional investors have an incentive to monitor their 
portfolio companies when their holdings represent a large part of the institution's total portfolio. 
We calculate the portfolio weight for an individual institutional investor as their investment in a 
company relative to their total investment in all their portfolios. Panel B of Table 7 shows the 
results using portfolio weights of the institutional investors instead of  their holdings. It is evident 
in Models 1-5 that the higher is the portfolio weight, the higher is the firm performance, in line 
with the findings of Fich et al. (2015). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
4.5 Robustness tests 
So far, we have used ROA or industry-adjusted ROA as the performance measure. To assess the 
robustness of our results, we use excess market returns as an alternative measure of performance. 
 22 
For each firm in each year, we calculate the stock returns and subtract the equivalent market 
benchmark returns. We expect a positive relationship between institutional holdings and excess 
market returns, provided institutional investors enhance the performance of the firms they back. 
In Models 1-5 of Table 8, we can see that institutional holdings do have a positive impact on 
excess market returns. The evidence is statistically and economically significant. This suggests 
that institutional investors enhance the performance of the companies they back, based on market 
and accounting-based measures of performance. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
4.6 Propensity score matching 
Our sample of unbacked companies are matched by size and industry. Due to the difficulties in 
finding an appropriate match for each company backed by institutional investors, we allow 
variations in size up to a maximum of 20%. However, as this is likely to induce bias in our 
findings regarding institutional holdings adding value to firm performance, we also use 
propensity score matching. Thus, we match each backed company with an equivalent unbacked 
company based on a propensity score estimated using size, leverage, liquidity, industry, and year. 
Using caliper radius matching, we classify each unbacked company as a match for a backed 
company if the propensity scores of the two companies differ by no more than 1% (following 
Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Using the sample of matched observations, we estimate our 
regression again (similarly to the models reported in Table 6 Panel A). Consistent with those 
prior results, we find that the institutional holding coefficients are lower than in our earlier 
analyses (Table 6 Panel A); however, they are still statistically and economically significant. 
 23 
Overall, the results in Table 9 suggest that institutional investors add value to their portfolio 
companies by enhancing their performance.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the impact of institutional holdings on the financialization process, and the 
performance of firms that attract institutional investors relative to their peers matched by 
industry and size, between 1997 and 2010. The empirical evidence shows that institutional 
investors influence the financialization process and the relationship is unidirectional according to 
a Granger causality test. Further, we show firms that attract institutional investors outperform 
their peers, using industry-adjusted and unadjusted performance measures. However, our results 
show that macroeconomic factors explain away the performance differences between firms with 
and without institutional investors. The better performance of firms that attract institutional 
investors, specifically corporations and insurance firms, remained significant even after 
controlling for macroeconomic factors. This suggests that these types of investors add more 
value to the companies they back than other institutional investors do.  
Overall, our results suggest that institutional investors play a significant role in shaping the 
financialization process through their contributions to capital markets. The implication of our 
results for the wider economy is of great significance in that institutional investors ultimately 
influence the economy through their capital market investment decisions. The financialization of 
industrial and commercial capital that has been unfolding over the last four decades has been of 
paramount importance as the activities of the financial sector have shifted away from its 
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traditional intermediating role. In other words, the increasing orientation of institutional investors 
towards financial activities is depriving the economy of productive physical investment that is 
likely to adversely affect long-term economic growth.  
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Table 1: Institutional holdings 
 
Investments by investor type (population) Investments by investor type (sample) Difference in means (t-test) 
 Corporations Pension funds Insurance companies Banks and trusts  Corporations Pension funds Insurance companies Banks and trusts     
Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (1)-(5) (2)-(6) (3)-(7) (4)-(8) 
                 
              
1997 0.480 (19) 0.512 (28) 0.674 (5) 0.448 (22)  0.615 0.408 0.591 0.548 -1.529 1.256 1.009 -1.469 
1998 0.476 (30) 0.503 (37) 0.398 (10) 0.085 (18)  0.334 0.574 0.110 0.290 1.045 -0.604 1.229 -0.850 
1999 0.444 (40) 0.467 (46) 0.349 (15) 0.092 (25)  0.489 0.396 0.153 0.034 -1.419 1.395 0.700 1.176 
2000 0.401 (36)  0.400 (42) 0.080 (14) 0.080 (23)  0.650 0.409 0.065 0.044 0.782 -1.232 1.034 0.870 
2001 0.682 (35) 0.528 (32) 0.170 (1) 0.108 (5)  0.804 0.597 0.170 0.005 -1.477 -1.370 1.308 1.005 
2002 0.613 (108) 0.184 (77) 0.122 (18) 0.068 (75)  0.627 0.195 0.050 0.040 -1.311 -1.398 0.561 0.847 
2003 0.465 (146) 0.178 (96) 0.172 ( 33) 0.056 (92)  0.569 0.082 0.288 0.056 -1.322 1.021 -1.437 -1.132 
2004 0.416 (148) 0.117 (155) 0.201 (57) 0.076 (148)  0.433 0.126 0.164 0.150 -0.787 -0.858 0.672 -0.824 
2005 0.530 (186) 0.093 (219) 0.159 (73) 0.135 (215)  0.652 0.075 0.125 0.143 -1.405 0.644 0.896 0.788 
2006 0.595 (221) 0.101 (243) 0.149 (68) 0.129 (242)  0.594 0.123 0.052 0.123 0.516 -1.381 0.943 0.572 
2007 0.444 (265) 0.107 (267) 0.114 (88) 0.091 (314)  0.559 0.133 0.120 0.084 -0.918 -1.224 -0.838 0.956 
2008 0.352 (257) 0.124 (282) 0.126 (93) 0.095 (307)  0.404 0.218 0.145 0.152 -1.269 -1.263 -0.596 -0.853 
2009 0.389 (245) 0.123 (258) 0.159 (72) 0.104 (285)  0.451 0.112 0.215 0.163 -0.717 0.720 -0.884 -1.054 
2010 0.394 (278) 0.122 (272) 0.115 (65) 0.090 (338)  0.391 0.101 0.109 0.078 1.027 0.530 0.827 1.227 
Average 0.477 (2014) 0.254 (2054) 0.213 (612) 0.118 (2019)  0.541 0.253 0.168 0.136 -1.140 0.783 1.292 -0.667 
This table shows the percentage of shares (expressed in decimal) owned by UK corporations, pension funds, insurance companies, and banks and trusts between 1997 and 2010. The 
values in brackets are the actual numbers of investments made (i.e. numbers of companies backed) by these institutional investors. Column 1-5 shows the holding and the number of 
investments for the full population, while column 5-8 shows the holding and the number for the random sample used in our analysis. We also test the difference in the percentage of 
institutional holdings between the population and the random sample 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample Mean Median StDev Min Max 
 
      
 
Leverage  0.105 0.045 0.125 0.000 0.355 
 
ROA 0.109 0.032 0.123 -0.692 0.667 
 
Size (million) 5608 4830 122 454 40420 
 
Liquidity 1.872 1.378 1.408 0.570 5.671 
 
MEC 0.114 0.150 0.135 -0.300 0.200 
 
RIR 2.764 2.400 1.195 1.400 5.100 
 
REER 113.81 116.00 10.24 94.10 126.50 
 
GDP per capita 37277 38079 2771 32194 40890 
 
TFP 97.864 98.900 4.691 89.500 104.500 
 
      
 
No of obs 14972     
 
      
 
Panel B: Subsample  Backed firms Unbacked firms  
 
 Mean Median Mean Median T-test Z-value 
      
 
Leverage 0.107 0.046 0.102 0.044 1.112 0.847 
ROA 0.179 0.049 0.034** 0.014 -2.130** -2.512** 
Size (million) 6430 8152 4787** 1507 -2.871** -2.741** 
Liquidity 1.887 1.391 1.862 1.366 0.115 0.167 
      
 
No of obs 5880  9092   
 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for the variables 
based on the random sample and matched sample of firms that are not backed by the institutional investors. Panel A shows the 
results for the full sample, while Panel B shows the results for the subsamples of firms that are backed and are not backed by 
institutional investors. The t-tests for the means are based on unequal samples and unequal variances. Differences in medians are 









 Model 1: DFinancial  
Development Index  
  Model 2: DFinancial  
Institution Index 
 
  Model 3: DFinancial  




Signs Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  Coeff             P-value  
Variable            
DCorporations  (+) 0.049*** (0.000)   0.046*** (0.000)  0.048*** (0.000)  
DPension funds  (+) 0.070*** (0.000)   0.065*** (0.000)  0.058*** (0.000)  
DInsurance firms  (+) 0.057*** (0.000)   0.053*** (0.000)  0.055*** (0.000)  
DBanks and trusts  (+) 0.067** (0.026)   0.072** (0.022)  0.064** (0.031)  
Ln (household debt) (+) 0.032 (0.131)   0.041 (0.141)  0.032 (0.166)  
Ln (real house price) (+) 0.072** (0.011)   0.061** (0.042)  0.059** (0.023)  
Ln (financial 
liberation) 
(+/-) -0.027 (0.168)   -0.031 (0.188)  -0.048 (0.114) 
 
Ln (financial sector 
leverage) 
(+) 0.173*** (0.000)   0.122*** (0.000)  0.126*** (0.000) 
 
Constant  0.217*** (0.000)   0.265*** (0.000)  0.303*** (0.000)  
            
Year and industry  Y    Y   Y   
No of obs  72    72   72   
Adjusted R2  0.112    0.114   0.111   
            
Notes: D denotes	 changes	 of	 the	 respective	 variables;	 The	 table	 shows	 the	 impact	 of	 institutional	 holding	 on	
financialization	controlling	for	other	common	determinants.	Model 1 shows the impact of institutional holdings on the 
Financial Development Index, Model 2 shows that on the Financial Institution Index and Model 3 shows that on the 
Financial Market Depth index. We control for the year and industry dummies. We use robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
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Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables 
Expected 
Signs               Coeff               P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
Corporations 
(+) 
0.055 (0.157)          
Pension funds 
(+) 
   0.010 (0.668)       
Insurance firms  
(+) 
      0.042* (0.087)    
Banks and trusts 
(+) 
         0.011 (0.629) 
Ln size 
(+/-) 
-0.038*** (0.000)  -0.039*** (0.000)  -0.039*** (0.000)  -0.039*** (0.000) 
Liquidity 
(+/-) 
0.077*** (0.000)  0.077*** (0.000)  0.077*** (0.000)  0.077*** (0.000) 
Ln leverage 
(-) 
-0.271*** (0.000)  -0.270*** (0.000)  -0.270*** (0.000)  -0.270*** (0.000) 
 
 
           
 
 
           
Constant 
 
0.257*** (0.000)  0.257*** (0.000)  0.257*** (0.000)  0.258*** (0.000) 
 
 
           
Year and industry 
 
Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
10484   12239   9675   10539  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.156   0.155   0.162   0.171  
Notes: Model 1 shows the impact of corporation holdings on performance, Model 2 that of pension fund holdings, Model 3 that of insurance firm holdings, Model 4 that of bank and 
trust holdings, and Model 5 that of all institutional holdings. The variables are as defined in the Appendix. We control for the year and industry dummies. We use robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Variables 
Expected 
Signs Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
MEC (+) 0.161** (0.010)             
RIR (+/-)    -0.018* (0.095)          
REER (+)       0.002*** (0.009)       
GDP per capita (+)          0.001 (0.148)    
TFP (+)             0.003 (0.214) 
Corporations (+) 0.096** (0.044)  0.100** (0.036)  0.095** (0.047)  0.100** (0.037)  0.101** (0.035) 
Pension funds (+) 0.051 (0.144)  0.056 (0.107)  0.050 (0.152)  0.055 (0.114)  0.055 (0.110) 
Insurance firms (+) 0.078** (0.035)  0.081** (0.027)  0.076** (0.039)  0.080** 0.030)  0.080** (0.029) 
Banks and trusts (+) 0.055 (0.114)  0.060* (0.081)  0.055 (0.114)  0.059* (0.088)  0.060* (0.085) 
Ln size (+/-) 0.012* (0.098)  0.012* (0.093)  0.012* (0.082)  0.012* (0.083)  0.012* (0.082) 
Liquidity (+/-) 0.081*** (0.000)  0.081*** (0.000)  0.082*** (0.000)  0.081*** (0.000)  0.081*** (0.000) 
Ln leverage (-) -0.349*** (0.000)  -0.349*** (0.000)  -0.350*** (0.000)  -0.349*** (0.000)  -0.350*** (0.000) 
                
                
Constant  0.273*** (0.000)  0.275*** (0.000)  0.296*** (0.000)  0.246*** (0.000)  0.239*** (0.000) 
                
Year and industry  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
14972   14972   14972   14972   14972  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.196   0.192   0.197   0.191   0.191  
Notes: Model 1 shows the impact of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), Model 2 that of the real long-term interest rate (RIR), Model 3 that of the real effective exchange rate 
(REER), Model 4 that of GDP per capita, and Model 5 that of total factor productivity (TFP). The variables are as defined in the Appendix. We control for the year and industry 
dummies. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Panel A: Full sample 
Expected 
Signs Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
MEC (+) 0.162** (0.010)             
RIR (+/-)    -0.019* (0.093)          
REER (+)       0.003*** (0.007)       
GDP per capita (+)          0.001 (0.141)    
TFP (+)             0.002 (0.216) 
DCorporations (+) 0.088** (0.041)  0.096** (0.041)  0.090** (0.034)  0.095** (0.041)  0.094** (0.029) 
DPension funds  (+) 0.047 (0.151)  0.049 (0.110)  0.043 (0.141)  0.048 (0.134)  0.041 (0.121) 
DInsurance firms  (+) 0.071** (0.038)  0.078** (0.033)  0.073** (0.031)  0.077** 0.030)  0.075** (0.032) 
DBanks and trusts (+) 0.061 (0.121)  0.056* (0.091)  0.049 (0.123)  0.046* (0.076)  0.052* (0.076) 
Ln size (+/-) 0.013* (0.078)  0.011* (0.075)  0.014* (0.071)  0.011* (0.091)  0.013* (0.093) 
Liquidity (+/-) 0.076*** (0.000)  0.086*** (0.000)  0.079*** (0.000)  0.084*** (0.000)  0.079*** (0.000) 
Ln leverage (-) -0.337*** (0.000)  -0.327*** (0.000)  -0.344*** (0.000)  -0.317*** (0.000)  -0.341*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
 
 
              
Constant 
 
0.211*** (0.000)  0.275*** (0.000)  0.296*** (0.000)  0.246*** (0.000)  0.241*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
Year and industry 
 
Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
14972   14972   14972   14972   14972  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.195   0.191   0.196   0.190   0.192  
 
Table 6 continues on next page 
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Table 6 continued 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Panel B: Subsample 
Expected 
Signs Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
MEC (+) 0.105** (0.010)             
RIR (+/-)    -0.013* (0.093)          
REER (+)       0.002*** (0.007)       
GDP per capita (+)          0.001 (0.141)    
TFP (+)             0.002 (0.226) 
DCorporations  (+) 0.063** (0.022)  0.076** (0.032)  0.065** (0.027)  0.094** (0.038)  0.075** (0.034) 
DPension funds  (+) 0.037 (0.163)  0.037 (0.131)  0.040 (0.162)  0.038 (0.140)  0.031 (0.151) 
DInsurance firms  (+) 0.050** (0.029)  0.052** (0.041)  0.073** (0.041)  0.052** 0.042)  0.054** (0.041) 
DBanks and trusts  (+) 0.037 (0.161)  0.037* (0.088)  0.036 (0.132)  0.045* (0.089)  0.034* (0.088) 
Ln size (+/-) 0.011* (0.081)  0.007* (0.068)  0.01*1 (0.083)  0.008* (0.094)  0.011* (0.081) 
Liquidity (+/-) 0.056** (0.011)  0.079** (0.041)  0.062** (0.022)  0.068** (0.012)  0.076** (0.020) 
Ln leverage (-) -0.297*** (0.000)  -0.268*** (0.000)  -0.220*** (0.000)  -0.209*** (0.000)  -0.280*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
 
 
              
Constant 
 
0.201*** (0.000)  0.209*** (0.000)  0.195*** (0.000)  0.192*** (0.000)  0.161*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
Year and industry 
 
Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
7620   7620   7620   7620   7620  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.195   0.191   0.196   0.190   0.192  
Notes: D denotes	changes	of	the	respective	variables;	Model 1 shows the impact of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), Model 2 that of the real long-term interest rate (RIR), 
Model 3 that of the real effective exchange rate (REER), Model 4 that of GDP per capita, and Model 5 that of total factor productivity (TFP). Panel A shows the results for the full 
sample, while Panel B show the results for the subsample of firms with ROA below the median value. The variables are as defined in the appendix. We control for the year and 
industry dummies. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Panel A: Institutional holdings  
Expected 
Signs Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
MEC (+) 0.112** (0.032)             
RIR (+/-)    -0.014 (0.103)          
REER (+)       0.002** (0.017)       
GDP per capita (+)          0.001 (0.133)    
TFP (+)             0.002 (0.201) 
DCorporations  (+) 0.078** (0.043)  0.087** (0.032)  0.081** (0.044)  0.083** (0.032)  0.085** (0.033) 
DPension funds  (+) 0.043 (0.164)  0.052 (0.121)  0.039 (0.162)  0.041 (0.141)  0.037 (0.141) 
DInsurance firms  (+) 0.072** (0.029)  0.069** (0.037)  0.070** (0.041)  0.071** 0.033)  0.074** (0.041) 
DBanks and trusts  (+) 0.057 (0.141)  0.051* (0.108)  0.047 (0.131)  0.047* (0.086)  0.050* (0.068) 
Ln size (+/-) 0.011* (0.088)  0.012* (0.071)  0.013* (0.082)  0.014* (0.089)  0.015* (0.073) 
Liquidity (+/-) 0.067*** (0.000)  0.075*** (0.000)  0.071*** (0.000)  0.076*** (0.000)  0.073*** (0.000) 
Ln leverage (-) -0.337*** (0.000)  -0.301*** (0.000)  -0.312*** (0.000)  -0.305*** (0.000)  -0.315*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
 
 
              
Constant 
 
0.191*** (0.000)  0.201*** (0.000)  0.217*** (0.000)  0.209*** (0.000)  0.221*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
Year and industry 
 
Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
14972   14972   14972   14972   14972  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.191   0.192   0.192   0.187   0.188  










Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Panel B: Portfolio weights 
Expected 
Signs Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
MEC (+) 0.163** (0.022)             
RIR (+/-)    -0.021* (0.088)          
REER (+)       0.005*** (0.005)       
GDP per capita (+)          0.002 (0.112)    
TFP (+)             0.002 (0.203) 
DCorporations  (+) 0.093** (0.032)  0.101** (0.032)  0.096** (0.041)  0.103** (0.022)  0.097** (0.031) 
DPension funds  (+) 0.053 (0.121)  0.055 (0.102)  0.046 (0.132)  0.051 (0.116)  0.043 (0.133) 
DInsurance firms  (+) 0.082** (0.022)  0.084** (0.031)  0.080** (0.037)  0.079** 0.035)  0.084** (0.021) 
DBanks and trusts  (+) 0.069 (0.110)  0.061* (0.087)  0.052 (0.131)  0.054* (0.088)  0.059* (0.065) 
Ln size (+/-) 0.014* (0.088)  0.013* (0.071)  0.016* (0.073)  0.018* (0.079)  0.017* (0.087) 
Liquidity (+/-) 0.072*** (0.000)  0.085*** (0.000)  0.082*** (0.000)  0.086*** (0.000)  0.083*** (0.000) 
Ln leverage (-) -0.331*** (0.000)  -0.333*** (0.000)  -0.341*** (0.000)  -0.318*** (0.000)  -0.346*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
 
 
              
Constant 
 
0.212*** (0.000)  0.269*** (0.000)  0.278*** (0.000)  0.238*** (0.000)  0.241*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
Year and industry 
 
Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
14972   14972   14972   14972   14972  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.188   0.191   0.193   0.189   0.191  
Notes: D denotes	changes	of	the	respective	variables;	Model 1 shows the impact of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), Model 2 that of the real long-term interest rate (RIR), 
Model 3 that of the real effective exchange rate (REER), Model 4 that of GDP per capita, and Model 5 that of total factor productivity (TFP). In Panel B, we report the results using the 
portfolio weights instead of institutional holdings. The variables are as defined in the Appendix. We control for the year and industry dummies. We use robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Variables 
Expected 
Signs Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
MEC (+) 0.156** (0.021)             
RIR (+/-)    -0.023* (0.075)          
REER (+)       0.011** (0.012)       
GDP per capita (+)          0.002 (0.122)    
TFP (+)             0.004 (0.313) 
DCorporations  (+) 0.082** (0.044)  0.093** (0.029)  0.089** (0.037)  0.094** (0.032)  0.091** (0.041) 
DPension funds  (+) 0.043 (0.137)  0.041 (0.121)  0.039 (0.127)  0.044 (0.123)  0.038 (0.145) 
DInsurance firms  (+) 0.076** (0.031)  0.077** (0.028)  0.073** (0.041)  0.071** (0.032)  0.072** (0.032) 
DBanks and trusts  (+) 0.054 (0.121)  0.057* (0.091)  0.048 (0.122)  0.047* (0.076)  0.057* (0.055) 
Ln size (+/-) 0.011* (0.079)  0.010* (0.069)  0.013* (0.077)  0.016* (0.081)  0.015* (0.077) 
Liquidity (+/-) 0.068*** (0.000)  0.088*** (0.000)  0.079*** (0.000)  0.083*** (0.000)  0.077*** (0.000) 
Ln leverage (-) -0.271*** (0.000)  -0.283*** (0.000)  -0.291*** (0.000)  -0.268*** (0.000)  -0.286*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
 
 
              
Constant 
 
0.134*** (0.000)  0.127*** (0.000)  0.131*** (0.000)  0.130*** (0.000)  0.133*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
Year and industry 
 
Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
14972   14972   14972   14972   14972  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.191   0.192   0.189   0.193   0.195  
Notes: D denotes	changes	of	the	respective	variables;	Model 1 shows the impact of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), Model 2 that of the real long-term interest rate (RIR), 
Model 3 that of the real effective exchange rate (REER), Model 4 that of GDP per capita, and Model 5 that of total factor productivity (TFP). The variables are as defined in the 
Appendix. We control for the year and industry dummies. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 9: Multivariate analysis (propensity score matching) - controlling for macroeconomic factors (dependent variable is change 




Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Variables 
Expected 
Signs Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
MEC (+) 0.091** (0.021)             
RIR (+/-)    -0.010* (0.075)          
REER (+)   D    0.002** (0.012)       
GDP per capita (+)          0.001 (0.122)    
TFP (+)             0.003 (0.313) 
DCorporations  (+) 0.057** (0.041)  0.060** (0.033)  0.052** (0.041)  0.067** (0.042)  0.067** (0.038) 
DPension funds  (+) 0.025 (0.157)  0.035 (0.132)  0.023 (0.165)  0.026 (0.132)  0.026 (0.151) 
DInsurance firms  (+) 0.043** (0.029)  0.055** (0.034)  0.047** (0.036)  0.051** (0.043)  0.050** (0.039) 
DBanks and trusts  (+) 0.034 (0.121)  0.035* (0.088)  0.029 (0.141)  0.027* (0.081)  0.029* (0.068) 
Ln size (+/-) 0.008 (0.155)  0.007 (0.269)  0.010 (0.261)  0.008 (0.171)  0.009 (0.181) 
Liquidity (+/-) 0.047 (0.1320)  0.061 (0.114)  0.055 (0.131)  0.045 (0.165)  0.046 (0.166) 
Ln leverage (-) -0.182 (0.1210)  -0.222 (0.131)  -0.241 (0.124)  -0.209 (0.161)  -0.225 (0.134) 
 
 
              
 
 
              
Constant 
 
0.143*** (0.000)  0.181*** (0.000)  0.192*** (0.000)  0.130*** (0.000)  0.159*** (0.000) 
 
 
              
Year and industry 
 
Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
No of obs 
 
3209   3209   3209   3209   3209  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.166   0.157   0.161   0.162   0.163  
Notes: D denotes	changes	of	the	respective	variables;	Model 1 shows the impact of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), Model 2 that of the real long-term interest rate (RIR), 
Model 3 that of the real effective exchange rate (REER), Model 4 that of GDP per capita, and Model 5 that of total factor productivity (TFP). The variables are as defined in the 
Appendix. We control for the year and industry dummies. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Appendix A: Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Corporations The ownership of corporations firms in a portfolio company 
Pension funds The ownership of pension funds in a portfolio company 
Insurance firms The ownership of insurance firms in a portfolio company 
Banks and trusts The ownership of banks and trusts in a portfolio company 
Ln size Logarithm of firms’ total assets 
Liquidity Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
Ln leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
Marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) Marginal efficiency of capital, total economy (AKGDV) - AMECO Database 
Real long-term interest rate (RIR) Central government bonds 20 years - AMECO Database 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) Real effective exchange rates (XUNRQ) - AMECO Database 
GDP per capita Constant GDP per capita (Federal Reserve) 
Total factor productivity (TFP) Total factor productivity (ZVGDF) - AMECO Database 
Financial Development Index Financial Development Index (FDFDIX) - IMF 
Financial Institution Index Financial Institution Index (FDTIDIX) - IMF 
Financial Market Depth Index Financial Market Depth Index (FDFMDIX) - IMF 
Household debt Household debt total, % of net disposable income (HHDEBT) - OECD 
Real house price House prices adjusted for retail prices – ONS, UK. 
Financial liberation Financial Liberation Index - CESifo DICE  











Appendix B: Granger causality tests 
Causality test    
 
Prob > F 
  
Panel A: Financial Development Index     
Financial Development Index         Corporations  0.000 
Financial Development Index  Pension funds  0.000 
Financial Development Index  Insurance firms  0.013 
Financial Development Index  Banks and trusts  0.022 
Institutional Holdings     
Corporations  Financial Development Index  0.586 
Pension funds  Financial Development Index  0.539 
Insurance firms  Financial Development Index  0.771 
Banks and trusts  Financial Development Index  0.190 
     
Panel B: Financial Institution Index      
Financial Institution Index  Corporations  0.940 
Financial Institution Index  Pension funds  0.161 
Financial Institution Index  Insurance firms  0.900 
Financial Institution Index  Banks and trusts  0.194 
Institutional Holdings     
Corporations  Financial Institution Index  0.030 
Pension funds  Financial Institution Index  0.010 
Insurance firms  Financial Institution Index  0.000 
Banks and trusts  Financial Institution Index  0.000 
     
Panel C: Financial Market Index  
    
Financial Market Depth Index  Corporations  0.002 
Financial Market Depth Index  Pension funds  0.463 
Financial Market Depth Index  Insurance firms  0.980 
Financial Market Depth Index  Banks and trusts  0.676 
Institutional Holdings      
Corporations  Financial Market Depth Index  0.020 
Pension funds  Financial Market Depth Index  0.000 
Insurance firms  Financial Market Depth Index  0.013 
Banks and trusts  Financial Market Depth Index  0.000 
This table shows the results of Granger causality tests. Panel A shows the results for the Financial Development Index, Panel B 
for the Financial Institution Index, and Panel C for the Financial Market Depth Index. Panel A shows that the lags of institutional 
holdings are significant at all conventional levels, while the lag of the Financial Development Index is not significant at any 
conventional level. This suggests that institutional holdings Granger cause financialization, while Financialization does not 
Granger cause the institutional holdings. The evidence is statistically significant and consistent for all measures of 
financialization (Panels B and C respectively). Overall, the results of the Granger causality test between financialization and 
institutional holdings show a unidirectional relationship. 
 
